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SAXCTIOXS AXD ETHICVL RELATIMTY
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
T( ) THE average lay reader at all interested in philosophicaland moral (juestions. it must seem totally unnecessary to argue
in favor of ethical relativity. Is it not a truism that morals, like
manners—and indeed morals have been called "superior manners"
—are shaped and determined by time, place, and circumstance? Have
not anthropologists, travelers, historians, and others furnished super-
abundant proof of ethical relativity?
We know that polygamy is moral and legal in certain parts of
the world. So is polyandry. We know that killing is not always
and everywhere a crime, and that lying is by many tribes deemed
a virtue. Even among the best elements of the most advanced na-
tions lying is considered a ^•enial offence, provided it is dictated bv
pure and disinterested motives.
In fact, one can hardly name a single act which is everywhere
treated and which always has heen treated as immoral and anti-social.
These facts prove the relativity of ethical concepts. r)Ut. as al-
ready stated, no one denies the relativity of ethics in this sense of
the phrase. However, there is another sense in which the same
phrase is understood by many modern thinkers, a sense not likely to
command universal acceptance among scientific and ])hilosophical
thinkers.
The distinguished Prof. Edward Westermarck has written an
important and arresting book on Ethical Relativity in which highlv
controversial views are expounded. The eminent sociologist and an-
thropologist is an uncompromising upholder of the theorv of rela-
ti\ ity in ethics in the deeper, psychological sense of the phrase.
The central conclusion he seeks to establish in his work is this
—
that "moral judgments are ultimately based on emotions, the moral
concepts being the generalization of emotional tendencies.'" This
proposition is divisible into two affirmations—namely, that moral
judgments are subjective, not objective, and, further, that the source
of these judgments is not the intellect, but the emotional nature of
homo sapiens.
Prof. A\'estermarck contends that, contrary to Kant and other
great thinkers, no moral principle that is trulv self-evident can be
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named. This means that logic and ratiocination have nothing to do
with moral principles. We feel first and reason afterward. That
which pleases us we subsequently approve ; that which ofifends or
hurts us we resent and then condemn in more or less precisely for-
mulated doctrines.
With these propositions for his premises, Prof. Westermarck has
little difficulty in puncturing and disposing of the old theological no-
tions of ethics as well as of the modern or contemporaneous assump-
tions. He rejects absolutism, as do the Hedonists and Utilitarians,
but, unHke these, he finds it impossible to find a solid foundation for
ethics either in the principle of the greatest good for the greatest
num.ber or in that of the greatest good or happiness for the normal
individual.
We cannot know what is good for the greatest number, or even
what, in the long run, is good for ourselves as individuals. Ignor-
ance, of course, is a very poor basis for moral injunctions.
It follows, according to Westermarck, that emotions, and emo-
tions only, are convertible into moral judgments and ethical prin-
ciples. Xot all emotions, of course, but some. Which?
Prof. Westermarck answers : First, the feeling of "self," and
secondly the sensations and feelings of pleasure and of pain. When
we feel pain, we also feel an immediate, instinctive resentment against
the author of that pain. Pain caused by a natural force or agent also
arouses resentment, as is seen in children and very primitive savages,
who will kick a stone or a chair they accidentally run up against.
Intelligent persons do not kick inanimate subjects, except when ex-
reedingly angry and furious—that is, when they revert to childhood.
But we certainly resent the insults and other injuries of fellow-
humans, and not infrequently kick and strike them. Now the same
natural emotion will account for codes and laws and agencies di-
rected against those who inflict pain upon us. The criminal code is
one of the embodied and crystallized modes of resentment and re-
taliation caused by pain.
Murder, theft, arson, forgery, libel, slander, and like offences
cause us pain, and we prohibit and punish them. The feeling of re-
sentment is primary ; the ideas and intellectual processes reflected in
criminal codes and moral injunctions are secondary. Xo one, says
Dr. Westermarck, will question the utility of the codes and injunc-
tions, once we recognize their origin and the sanctions back of them.
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The sensation or feeling" of pleasure gives rise to gratitude, ap-
pro\al. friendly appreciation, or, in the author's words, "retributive
kindliness." These feelings or sentiments, again, generate ideas and
principles, ^^'e commend those acts or courses of action which tend
to render us individually and collectively contented, happy, secure.
The commendations find e\-cntual embodiment in appropriate doc-
trines and formulae.
Thus far it is impossible to disagree with Dr. \\'estermarck. But
is he justified in claiming startling originality for his views? Is he
not, after all, a philosophical utilitarian?
The emotions he regards as the sanctions of moral codes are bi-
ologically useful, as he points out. The concepts based on these emo-
tions are also useful. Is it not clear, then, that iifility is the basis of
ethics and the sanction of moral laws and commands? Not always,
of course, individual utility, but certainly always social iifilify.
The objection to the utility theory—namely, that we cannot know
what is really good for us—applies to the Westermarck view as well.
Pleasure and pain are not propositions, but sensations, and, as we
have seen, very useful sensations, but our ideas and concepts of
morality, based on those sensations are useful only if, and in so far
as, they are correct. Manifestly, there is no absolute guaranty of the
correctness and truth of the generalizations that spring from feel-
ings. Do we know that capital punishment is useful, deterrent, and
preventive? We do not. Yet capital punishment is a result of the
pain-pleasure motive stressed by Dr. Westermarck. Our laws and
regulations against business fraud and stock gambling are notori-
ously insufficient ; }et there is no uncertainty as to the pain caused
by the tricks and manipulations of the dishonest and greedy stock
traders and the faithless directors of corporations risking their money
in the securities market.
The truth, of course, is simply this : We think we know and we
act upon such limited knowledge as we possess. Our moral and
criminal codes are largely the results of collective experience inter-
preted by the leaders, lawmakers, and philosophers of the period.
The function of the lawmaker is not to anticipate demand, but to
meet it. As the psychologists say, a law is significant and effective
only if it embodies a social convention, an ascertained and felt need.
Even unpopular and disregarded laws—and we have too many such
—
represent the insistent and persistent demands of strong and mili-
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tant groups aided, at least passively, by larger groups.
In short, moral ideas are the ideas of the dominant elements in
the given body politic. Authority makes law, said Hobbes. But the
authority that makes law has behind it the sanction of the tribe, the
community, the environment.
Thus, to repeat, utility is the only real basis of moral ideas, but
the individual is not permitted to decide for himself what will and
what will not conduce to the success and prosperity of the commun-
ity of which he is a member. The decision rests with the authorita-
tive spokesmen of the community, be they medicine-men, priests,
moralists, men of science, or captains of industry and finance.
Can we conclude, then, that ethical ideas are subjective? By no
means. Pain and pleasure are indeed subjective, but the ideas de-
rived from the sensations of pain and pleasure are at once subjective
and objective. Whatever lends itself to generalization, abstraction,
synthesis, is objective. Science is certainly objective, for the laws of
logic and thought are the same for all normal human beings capa-
ble of reasoning, criticism, verification, and correction. Ethical sci-
ence is no exxeption to the rule.
The point may be raised that even among the most advanced peo-
ples there are wide divergencies of opinion in respect of moral ideas
or propositions. Is communism moral ? Is it proper to limit or abol-
ish economic freedom? Is currency inflation moral? Is any form
or degree of censorship moral? What of the claims and demands
of the radical eugenists? Has society the right to sterilize the un-
fit—and incidentally to define fitness and unfitness? What of birth
control, easy divorce, and a hundred other contemporary questions?
The wisest of us disagree with regard to them. But what does that
prove 'f Simply, that the social and moral sciences are not exact, and
that the evidence available admits of several interpretations. Pas-
sion, self-interest, bias, obscure judgment, and in the nature of
things human no appeal to experiment and verification is possible.
And yet, most of our laws command all but universal assent ; they
would be nullified with remarkable ease but for that sanction—as-
sent. Dr. Albert Shaw has contended, indeed, that in the United
States all important legislation has been the result of virtually unani-
mous demand and consent.
Certainly, that is the ideal, the goal society is struggling to reach.
Tyrann}-, whether reactionary or revolutionary, whether communist
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or fascist, is a passing phase. W'e must return to liberty, tolerance,
respect for personalit}-. spiritual and moral and aesthetic individ-
ualism. But civilized individuals like and wish to work together, to
plav together, to exchange ideas, to share joys and sorrows. More
and more, under free institutions, will human beings recognize that
abundant life and progress depend upon universal acceptance of cer-
tain fundamental principles and conditions. This recognition will
be based at once on feeling and on reason. Ethics thus may become
more and more scientific. "The fear of moral anarchy among the
theological or metaphysical absolutists is utterly groundless. Even
in the arts there is no real or lasting anarchy. The utmost freedom
in letters, music, and painting leads to agreement and orderly judg-
ment. Schools, movements, experiments come and go, but the giants
and classics are not affected in the least by. these ephemeral and
superficial agitations. Beauty reigns autocratically, although it is
relative up to a certain point. Utility ultimately dictates and enjoins
ethical ideas and concepts, and it is the business of scientific thought
to justify these ideas and concepts if or when they are challenged.
Life is dvnamic, and social conditions change. But no intelligent
person will contend that it is possible for any community or society
to dispense with ethical standards and ideas, or that all ethical ideals
have equal validity. Civilization has its roots in certain tacit under-
standings and compacts. To the individual, it has its price. To the
body politic and social, we may repeat, the price of civilization is
self-restraint. ^Majorities and governments are not infallible inter-
preters of social utility and social expediency.

